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The decision in the principal case has little to recommend it since
it was not compelled by valid Virginia precedents, draws a false dis-
tinction between negligence liability and strict liability, and results
in an unjust loss allocation. Further, the court failed to approach the
problem logically by first determining a basis of liability and then
determining whether immunity would relieve the defendant from this
liability. It is submitted that a better result would have been to impose
strict liability upon contractors who engage in blasting and to re-
fuse to extend governmental immunity to state blastihg contractors.
JON A. KRR
CREDIT CARDS:
THE LIABILITY OF THE CARD HOLDER
FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURCHASES
The increasing use of credit cards1 requires solving definitively
whether the issuer or holder is ultimately liable for credit card pur-
chases not authorized by the holder.2 The question of liability for
unauthorized purchases most frequently arises when a credit card is
lost or stolen and an unauthorized party makes purchases with the
holder's card. When the holder refuses to pay the unauthorized
charges, the issuer brings suit against him to recover the amount of
the unauthorized purchases. The law concerning liability for these
purchases divides into two categories: (i) no risk-allocation provision
in the issuer-holder contract, (2) liability for unauthorized purchases
expressly provided for in the issuer-holder contract.
A typical case in which the contract had no express risk-allocation
provision is Thomas v. Central Charge Serv., Inc.,3 where the issuer
sought to recover the amounts charged to the holder's account by an
his apportioned share of the cost of constructing the highway, and as a result he
would be irrationally discriminated against as compared with other taxpayers. No
authority on this point has been found, and one can only speculate as to the out-
come of such an argument, but such a contention seems feasible.
2See generally: Toward a Cashless Society, Time Magazine, Vol. 86, No. 19,
Nov. 5, 1965, p. 97a.
For a detailed discussion of credit cards and the relationship between the issuer,
seller, and holder, see Robinson, New Developments in Retail Financing, 8 Kan. L.
Rev. 554, 567-74 (s96o); Comment, the Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal
Infant, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 459 (g6o).
3212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
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unauthorized user. Having made a single purchase with his credit
card, the holder realized the card was missing. However, he failed to
notify the issuer of its disappearance, and sellers continued to honor
the card when used by one subsequently discovered to be an unauthor-
ized user.
On appeal, the court held that a holder who had not expressly
agreed to pay for unauthorized purchases and who had not expressly
bound himself to report its disappearance is not liable for unauthor-
ized charges. Thomas further held that the holder's failure to exercise
due care in the use of the card was insufficient to support an action
to recover damages on a theory of an implied promise to pay for pur-
chases made after the credit card had been lost or stolen.
Prior to Thomas, there were only four reported cases4 which en-
tertained the issue of the holder's liability in the absence of an ex-
press risk-allocation provision.5 Three views of risk-allocation emerged
from these cases. The first view arose from Wanamaker v. Megary,o
a case of first impression, in which the court held that the card was
an order upon the creditor-seller to deliver goods and to charge the
holder's account upon the presentation of the card by any person.
The holder was held absolutely liable for all the purchases because he
had made the unauthorized purchases possible by his failure to keep
the card in a secure place. The court reasoned that the one making
the loss possibly should be liable for its consequences despite the hard-
ship this rule might have upon the holder.
7
The second view, now supported by Thomas, was set forth in Lit
Bros. v. Haines.8 The Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly rejected
both the result and reasoning9 in Wanamaker, and held that, absent
express agreement to the contrary, a credit card is merely a means of
identification; hence, the holder is not liable for any of the unauthor-
'Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 255 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (Kan. City Ct. App.
1931); Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 At. 131 (1923); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plot-
nick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1934); Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (C.P.
1915); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 762 (1945).
'The lack of cases may be attributed to the low percentage of defaults or mis-
uses as well as the reluctance of the issuers for reasons of good will and avoidance
of bad publicity to sue. Note, 35 Notre Dame Law. 225, 23o (196o). Also, from a prac-
tical standpoint, the small size of the individual accounts of holders makes profitable
collection by suit difficult. See generally, Claflin, the Credit Card-A New Instru-
ment, 33 Conn. B. J. 1 (1959).
6Supra note 4.
-The court drew an analogy between the card and a negotiable instrument




ized purchases. 10 In accord with this view is a decision 1 which held
that the holder's liability depended upon whether he had authorized
another to use the card. Otherwise the holder would be absolved of
all liability.'
2
The third view arose from Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick13 which held
that there is an implied obligation on the part of each party to ex-
ercise due care, the holder in using the card and the issuer in honoring
it.14 In essence, the court resorted to a balancing process which weighed
the care of the respective parties. As a result of this balancing process
the defendant-holder was held liable after it was determined that his
lack of care primarily contributed to the unauthorized purchases. The
court added that absent any negligence on the holder's part the issuer
would have to bear the risk because there was no risk-allocation clause
in the contract.
In weighing the equities of the three views, the strict holder lia-
bility view of Wanamaker is inequitable because it imposes such a
high degree of care upon the holder in his use and custody of a credit
card that it makes the holder a virtual insurer since he would be liable
even though the issuer was notified promptly of the loss.15 The second
view, expressed in Thomas, works an undue hardship upon the issuer
who must absorb the risk for all unauthorized purchases regardless
of the holder's failure to use due care.
Both the Wanamaker and Thomas views fail to discuss whether
reasonable care should be required of the parties involved.16 Instead,
Wanamaker and Thomas base their reasoning on whether an abso-
lute contractual obligation to pay for the unauthorized purchases
should be implied from the issuer-holder relationship."
Gulf Ref., where the negligence of the parties was considered, 17 is
"The decision in Lit Bros. v. Haines must be viewed in the light of the fact
that evidence indicated negligence on the part of the issuer. Id. at 131; Comment,
The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 459,
482 (1960).
"Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, supra note 4.
"I-d. at 683.
13Supra note 4.
"'The court noted that the holder had neglected to give notice of theft to the
issuer so that the issuer could prevent the subsequent use of the card. This fact
permitted the court to hold that liability was a jury question and that the jury
should consider defendant's contention that the dealer had not exercised due care
when extending credit. Annot., 158 A.L.R. 762, 763 (1945).
1r9 Kan. L. Rev. 325, 326 (g6i).
"Thomas brought the issue of due care into its opinion but stated that nothing
should turn on this issue. 212 A.2d 533, 534 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
"The case is supported in Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 22 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243, 249
(196o), in which the court states: "The theory of liability expressed in Gulf Ref.
1966]
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the most equitable approach in view of the benefits derived by each
party to the credit card contract. The arrangement primarily bene-
fits the issuer as a sales promotion device through the extension of
credit to potential customers. The holder benefits both by obtaining
short term credit and by avoiding the necessity of carrying large
amounts of cash.' 8 Since the benefits of the credit card accrue to both
parties, the risk of loss should also be apportioned by requiring each
party to exercise due care to protect the other.
Although none of the foregoing cases dealt with credit cards con-
taining risk-allocation clauses, they represent the development to date
of the basic theories of liability allocation. Most credit card arrange-
ments now have a contract provision 19 in which the issuer seeks to
impose the risk of unauthorized purchases upon the holder until
notice of loss or theft is reported to the issuer.
20
The jurisdictions which have interpreted the risk-allocation clauses
are in conflict. One view interprets such clauses literally and renders
the holder liable for all purchases prior to notice;21 moreover, this
view permits the issuer to recover even though the seller has not in-
quired into the purchaser's authority to use the card.22 In support of
Co. v. Plotnick ... appeals to us as basically sound, i.e., that both the card owner
and the card issuer must show the exercise of care, the former in the custody
of his card and the latter in making reasonable inquiry when it is used."
181t is arguable that the issuer derives a greater benefit by the increased patron-
age. Further the cost of processing the invoices and the collection process is un-
doubtedly shifted back to the consumer in the form of higher prices. In Union
Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 17, at 249-50, the court said that the issuer "received
a benefit consisting of adding another potential customer for the sale of its
products by facilitating purchases through the convenient use of credit." The court
apparently concluded from this that the holder benefited less from the arrange-
ment than did the issuer.
9E.g., Humble Oil & Refining Co. credit card: "By acceptance of this card, cus-
tomer named hereon agrees to the terms of issue, and assumes responsibility for
purchases made through its use prior to its surrender to Humble, or prior to the
receipt by Humble of written notice of its loss or theft." With the exception of the
principal case, all the reported cases since 1931 have contained a risk-allocation
provision. See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 762 (1945).
2OWhether the card holder has accepted the contract will depend on his
manifestation of assent to the terms on the card. Goltra v. United States, 96 F. Supp.
618 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Restatement, Contracts § 20 (1932); see Williston, i Contracts
§ 90 (3d ed. 1957). Generally such acceptance of a document which purports to be
a contract constitutes assent to its terms. 3 Corbin, Contracts § 607 (rev. ed. 196o);
Restatement, Contracts § 70 (1932); 1 Williston, Contracts § 90 A (3d ed. 1957); see
63 Harv. L. Rev. 494 (1950). The criterion for invoking this general rule is whether
a reasonably prudent man would have seen the fine print terms. i Williston, Con-
tracts § go C (3 d ed. 1957).
-1Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 54 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, m68 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
2'£exaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, supra note 21.
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this literal interpretation, Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein23 held that when
the terms of the contract were reasonable and represented an agree-
ment to share the risk, the holder will be responsible for all pur-
chases that occur prior to notification, while the issuer will be re-
sponsible for all purchases that occur after receipt of notice. With
this analysis the holder was held liable for the purchases made with
his card, because the risk-allocation clause 24 is "an original undertak-
ing in which ... [the holder] made it his own responsibility for any
use of the card.
25
Texaco rejected the argument that the sellers must inquire into
the purchaser's authority to use the card before extending credit. The
court reasoned that "with the increasing use of the credit card and its
growing importance to the economy, the imposition of a high duty of
diligence upon the major oil companies ... would result in an impair-
ment of an important segment of our economic structure." 26 This im-
pairment would result from requiring collateral identification, rather
than relying upon the card itself as the sole identification. 27
A second view, in which the courts refuse to inquire into the op-
eration of risk-allocation clauses, permits the holder to avoid liability
under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the provisions of the
contract. 28 This approach, as illustrated by Union Oil Co. v. Lull,29
suppresses the reliability characteristic of the credit card by requiring
that both the issuer and creditor-seller30 use a high degree of care 3'
'34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962).
"The Texaco card provided that "the person ... whose name is embossed on
the reverse side ... assumes full responsibility for all purchases made hereunder
by any one through the use of this credit card prior to surrendering it to the
company or to giving the company notice in writing that the card has been lost
or stolen." Id. at 53.
mId. at 54.
'id. at 55. "Unless actual notice of loss is given to the company, it can have
no way of knowing of such loss, and to require some thirty thousand dealers to
suspect the loss of any particular credit card and use diligence against its abuse is
not within the requirements of plaintiff as issuer of the credit card." Id.
2See Model Penal Code § 224.6, status of section (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
2-Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945);
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960); 43 N.C.L. Rev. 416 (1965).
2'Union Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 28.
3The courts applying this approach state that the issuer, after paying the
seller the charges, becomes an assignee of the seller and under general assignment
law the holder may assert all defenses against the issuer that he could against the
seller. Cases cited note 28 supra. Diners' Club, Inc. v. Whited, Civil No. A 10872
App. Dep't Cal. Aug. 6, 1964, has been interpreted to imply that both the issuer and
the dealer have to use due care regardless of the contractual provisions and regard-
less of whether there is an asignment situation. 43 N.C.L. Rev. 416, 421 (1965).
The assignlinnt theory overlooks the real nature of the contract between the
parties. As a rule the card holder promises to pay the issuer for unauthorized
x966"]
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in extending credit before the holder will be bound by the risk-allo-
cation provision. Union Oil Co. further limited the holder's obliga-
tion by holding that the issuer had the burden of proving that the
seller did in fact exercise the necessary care. 32 Such care demands
that the dealer obtain additional identification before extending
credit.3 3 If this care cannot be proved, the seller and issuer extend
credit at their own risk.
Union Oil Co. reasoned from the risk-allocation language of the
contract that the "defendant is essentially a gratuitous indemna-
tor .... ,,34 Through this analysis the court implied a promise on the
seller's part "to exercise reasonable diligence ... in transactions which
may create indemnity liability." 35 A Texas decision 36 held that a risk-
allocation clause need not be strictly construed: "It is necessarily im-
plied from this broad guaranty that the person extending credit must
purchases, and the issuer promises to credit the sellers' accounts for the respec-
tive amounts. The sellers have no claim against the holder because his promise runs
only to the issuer. It would appear that a direct obligation theory is more realistic.
See Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 Calif.
L. Rev. 459, 499 (196o); Note, 35 Notre Dame Law. 225, 229 (ig6o). This theory views
the issuer's claim as arising directly from the holder's promise rather than from
the individual sales by the dealer. The same result would occur by holding that
the card holder's promise is subject to a constructive condition that the dealers
exercise due care. See 13 Stan. L. Rev. 15o, 153 (ig6o).
31In many transactions analogous to credit card sales, the courts have imposed
the duty of reasonable inquiry before honoring the instrument involved. E.g., Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Mechanic's Am. Nat'l Bank, 148 Mo. App. 1, 127 S. W.
429 (1910) (drawer bank cannot recover for payment on a forged check where it was
negligent in accepting the check and holding it for 3o days). Kummel v. Germania
Say. Bank, 127 N.Y. 488, 28 N.E. 398 (1891) (negligent payment to imposter pre-
senting a stolen passbook). Commisso v. National City Bank, 174 Misc. 409, 21
N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (negligent bank was not relieved by an agreement of
nonliability for unauthorized withdrawal when it was negligent in ascertaining
the validity of the signature presented.)
=For this rule the court admitted that there was no direct authority. Union
Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 28, at 254. The basic rules of evidence suggest, how-
ever, that the holder should have the burden of proving the seller's negligence.
See McCormick, Evidence § 318 (1954).
"Union Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 28, at 254. Undeniably, the rule works a
hardship upon the issuer. See Comment, 1o9 U. Pa. L. Rev. 266, 268 (196o). Yet,
it would be a harsher rule to place the burden of proof upon the holder since he
is not present when the charges are made. Unlike the issuer, the holder could not
possibly sustain such a burden of proof. Moreover, by placing the burden on the
issuer, the issuer could then protect himself and the holder by requiring that the
seller develop accurate methods of recording the details of the credit transaction.
This approach would also require that sellers use a uniform system of inquiry as
to the purchaser's authority. By following these procedures the issuer could meet his
burden of proof and also prevent many unauthorized purchases.
"4Union Oil Co. v. Lull, supra note 28, at 249.
"Id. at 250.
"Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., supra note 28.
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do so in good faith .... "3 7 Yet failure to exercise reasonable diligence
may not be the equivalent of failure to act in good faith.
Since the Union Oil Co. result seems directly contrary to the pur-
port of the risk-allocation clause in the contract, the decision can only
be justified on compelling extra-contract grounds.38 But the courts
that follow the Union Oil Co. approach have reached their decision
through broad construction of the language of the risk-allocation
clauses, rather than through use of any specific policy reasons.39
One possible reason the courts have not construed such risk-al-
location clauses literally is their reluctance to uphold agreements
where the bargaining power of the party on whom the risk is placed
is small compared to that of the exculpated party.40 In credit card
arrangements the applicant's choice of contract provisions is limited.
It is doubtful, for example, that credit card applicants can obtain an
oil company credit card which does not contain a clause placing the
risk of unauthorized purchases on the holder.4 1
Another possible reason for avoiding a literal interpretation of
such risk-allocation clauses arises from the fact that the issuer is de-
pendent upon a broad base of creditor-participants and should ex-
pect to absorb the risk of nonpayment as part of his business.42
Because the case law in this area is far from settled, and because
there are many considerations involved in placing liability upon
either party, the legislatures should create a more uniform and accep-
table solution than the courts have done thus far.43 With the aid of
legislative resources the issues of risk-allocation may be more ade-
quately decided.
Unless legislative or other investigation or experience shows rea-
8MId. at 794.
'Comment, 1o9 Pa. L. Rev. 266, 269 (196o).
3in fact, Texaco distinguished its decision from Union Oil Co. on the basis of
the wording on the respective cards. In Union Oil the words were such that the
holder "guarantees payment" for any purchases, while in Texaco, he "assumes
full responsibility" for them.
'6A Corbin, Contracts § 1472 (rev. ed. 1962); Restatement, Contracts § 575
(1932).
tComment, Applicability of Exculpatory Clause Principles to Credit Card Risk-
Shifting Clauses, 22 La. L. Rev. 64 o , 647 (1962).
"See Claflin, The Credit Card-A New Instrument, 33 Conn. B.J. 1, 3 (1959).
'3Only the New York legislature has been cognizance of this problem. Gen-
eral Business Law § 512 provides in part as follows: "A provision to impose liabil-
ity on an obligor for the purchase or lease of property or services by the use of a
credit card after its loss or theft is effective only if it is conspicuously written or
printed in a size at least equal to eight point bold type either on the card, or on a
writing accompanying the card when issued or on the obligor's application for the
card...."
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